Functionalism

Now in my opinion functionalism seems confused both meanings when it holds the following argument: given that there is a series of mental phenomena that are not aware, but whose existence is necessary to postulate (whether by necessity theoretical and/or empirical evidence) as a causal determinants and to make intelligible certain aspects of conscious experience; It follows that the level of consciousness is not relevant, since what really matters is the level of the unconscious. Once rid of the need to conceptualize as a necessary attribute of mental consciousness, functionalism seems to feel free to move one step closer to now hold that since consciousness is not relevant as defining of mental, there could be mental systems even when there was no consciousness. Idea that allows you to conclude that what is truly relevant if the relacional-funcional logic – informational system (lease computations operating on informational representations), then any system that implements them is a mental system, beyond the substance of which is compound 4. The fallacy of the unconscious aconciente in the nucleus of the aforementioned arguments, functionalism does not seem warn that you among the postulation of a system of mental representations unconscious inside a conscious mind and a computer software, there may be an abyss of difference. Vale conclude then that the approval of both orders already is not supported in the relational analogy the mind is brain as software is to hardware, but in the uncritical application of a double thesis that after deny relevance to mind conscious asserts that the unconscious mind must be essentially computational. In short: what is the contribution of the theories informationalist and functionalists for explanation and understanding of mental? The previous signs about structural functionalism in both generic theory of mental difficulties, are independent from the consideration of its successes to explain and understand how this organized the mind and how it works.